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Coronabonds	are	a	pragmatic	response	to	a	crisis	–
and	are	not	about	cross-EU	transfers	or	solidarity
Common	debt	instruments	created	by	the	European	Union,	of	which	coronabonds	are
currently	the	most	urgent	and	salient	example,	evoke	in	some	countries	the	fear	that	the
Eurozone	may	be	heading	towards	a	‘transfer	union’.	Some	advocates	also	misleadingly
justify	these	innovations	by	an	appeal	to	European	‘solidarity’.	Yet,	in	practice,	Michael
Paetz	and	Patrick	Kaczmarczyk	argue	that	such	instruments	require	only	a	dose	of
pragmatism.	We	need	to	fundamentally	reframe	the	debate	around	‘debt	mutualisation’	in
Europe	on	more	evidence-based	and	realistic	lines	if	the	Eurozone	is	to	survive.
In	mid-March,	one	of	us	argued	in	a	EUROPP	article	that	there	would	be	no	way	back	to	business	as	usual	in	the
European	Monetary	Union	(EMU).	Any	sober	assessment	of	the	coronavirus	legacy	makes	it	clear	that	the	public
debt	ratios	across	European	economies	will	increase	substantially.	So	a	common	debt	instrument	remains	the	only
option	to	address	the	challenge	for	member	states’	public	finances	sustainably,	efficiently,	and	effectively.
The	proposal	for	Euro-	or	Corona-Bonds	put	forward	by	several	European	economies,	and	backed	by	the	European
Central	Bank	(ECB),	faced	a	rejection	by	northern	European	economies.	They	prefer	instead	to	draw	on	the
European	Stability	Mechanism	(ESM).	However,	as	Bruegel	rightly	argued,	the	ESM’s	firepower	of	EUR	410	billion
is	insufficient.	And	although	the	ESM	conditionalities	could	be	temporarily	dismantled,	that	still	leaves	room	for
countries	to	be	forced	back	into	austerity	after	the	crisis,	making	it	an	inappropriate	instrument.	Most	importantly,
the	ESM	proposal	cannot	be	sold	politically	in	the	most	heavily	affected	countries	–	not	least,	because	the	legacy	of
austerity	is	one	of	the	main	causes	for	the	severity	of	the	current	crisis	and	(arguably	for	some	of)	the	death	toll.
So	the	Covid-19	crisis	has	once	again	exposed	the	rifts	between	the	southern	and	northern	European	economies,
which	previously	peaked	during	the	Eurozone	crisis	that	erupted	ten	years	ago.	The	debate	about	‘debt
mutualisation’	is	often	framed	around	‘solidarity’	or	‘transfers’.	Germany	and	the	Netherlands,	who	have	reduced
their	debt	burden	over	the	past	years,	are	now	called	to	show	solidarity	to	help	Italy	and	Spain.	But	conservative,
liberal,	and	right-wing	forces	in	northern	countries	wonder	why	German	and	Dutch	taxpayers	should	have	to	make
up	for	the	past	insufficient	saving	efforts	of	the	southerners.	German	newspapers	are	already	warning	about	a
‘transfer	union’,	suggesting	that	the	mechanisms	already	apply	and	that	policymakers	should	resist	this	alleged
“injustice”.	Gideon	Rachman	recently	wrote	a	piece	in	the	FT,	in	which	he	expressed	his	sympathies	for	the
arguments	made	by	the	northern	states.	However,	the	article	revealed	in	the	most	exemplary	manner	how	a	lack	of
understanding	of	the	common	debt	instrument	leads	to	spurious	conclusions	of	what	they	entail.
Dutch	Prime	Minister	Mark	Rutte	speaking	during	a	European	Council	meeting	in	February	2020,	Credit:	European	Union
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In	reality,	this	issue	is	neither	about	transfers	nor	about	solidarity.	The	European	Central	Bank	(ECB)	simply	needs
to	stand	ready	to	purchase	Euro-bonds.	This	step	would	make	them	risk-free	and	facilitate	funding	for	Eurozone
member	states,	even	if	they	would	have	to	be	sold	to	capital	markets	in	a	first	instance.	The	necessary	funds	for
this	can	be	created	by	a	simple	balance	sheet	extension	and	backed	by	the	ECB’s	promise	to	buy	–	not	by	taking
anything	away	from	German	or	Dutch	taxpayers.	This	of	course	applies	to	national	government	bonds	purchased
by	the	ECB	also.	These	bonds	could	remain	on	the	central	bank’s	balance	sheet	until	the	end	of	time,	without	any
major	consequences	for	the	functioning	of	our	European	economy.	Consequentially,	there	is	as	little	need	for
‘solidarity’	as	there	is	for	‘transfers’.	The	ECB	merely	has	to	take	the	responsibility	for	sustainable	interest	rates	of
all	European	government	debt,	which	does	not	entail	any	disadvantages,	let	alone	transfers.
Understanding	this	point	is	crucial.	This	is	precisely	the	mechanism	by	which	all	central	banks	stabilise	bond	prices
and	interest	rates	across	capitalist	economies.	And	it	is	the	reason	why	there	is	no	taxpayers’	money	needed	(and
used)	to	bail	out	banks,	as	in	2008-2009,	or	to	inject	hundreds	of	billion	euros,	or	in	the	case	of	the	US,	2	trillion
USD,	into	capital	markets,	as	in	2020.	The	Eurozone	might	be	a	specific	case,	given	that	‘monetary	financing’	is
forbidden	by	the	Maastricht	Treaty.	Yet	practically,	it	is	exactly	what	happened	with	the	ECB’s	previous
announcement	of	Outright	Monetary	Transactions	(OMT)	and	subsequent	bond	purchasing	programmes	–	for
which	the	ECB	faced	down	severe	criticisms	and	accusations	in	the		constitutional	courts,	notably	in	Germany.
In	some	ways,	it	is	ironic	that	the	harshest	resistance	comes	from	the	country,	which	relied	on	a	certain	form	of
“monetary	financing”	in	its	currency	reform	1948,	which	set	the	starting	point	for	its	post-war	recovery:	The
‘Ausgleichsforderungen’	(compensation	claims)	of	the	‘Bank	deutscher	Länder’	(the	forerunner	of	the	German
Bundesbank),	created	by	the	stroke	of	a	pen,	were	booked	as	the	counterpart	of	the	paper	bills	printed	and	entitled
‘Deutsche	Mark’.	They	are	still	on	the	Bundesbank’s	balance	sheet	today.
While	the	tensions	around	common	debt	instruments	and	monetary	financing	in	the	Eurozone	have	started	to	boil,
the	monetary	union	might	face	its	‘Waterloo	moment’	when	the	renewal	of	maturing	bonds	is	imminent	and	the
Pandemic	Emergency	Purchase	Programme	(PEPP)	expires.	Just	as	pure	lending	to	small	and	medium	enterprises
(SMEs)	will	not	suffice,	because	they	will	not	be	able	to	pay	off	the	loans,	governments	will	not	be	able	to	repay
their	debts	either.	If	the	interest	rates	for	government	borrowing	were	to	be	set	by	financial	markets	and	the	current
deficit	criteria	remained	in	place,	the	Eurozone	will	not	survive.
Firstly,	the	high	debt	burdens,	especially	of	southern	European	economies	(including	France),	will	lead	to	exorbitant
interest	rates	that	will	threaten	financial	stability	across	the	Eurozone.	Secondly,	no	political	leader	in	the	South	will
now	be	able	to	re-sell	again	the	austerity	medicine	that	previously	wrecked	their	economies,	and	which	certainly
contributed	to	tens	of	thousands	of	deaths	during	the	current	pandemic.	This	issue	has	become	too	politically
salient,	and	populist	politicians	like	Salvini,	Le	Pen	et	al	stand	ready	to	capitalise	from	another	failure	of	European
policymakers.
It	is	up	to	policymakers	in	the	EU,	notably	in	the	northern	member	states,	to	decide	whether	or	not	the	EMU	will
survive.	So,	what	needs	to	be	done?
Most	importantly,	the	ECB	must	guarantee	that	all	government	bonds	in	the	euro	zone	are	risk-free.	This
would	eliminate	the	possibility	of	national	default,	and	thus	stabilise	financial	markets	and	interest	rates	–
regardless	of	how	high	the	debt	ratios	may	be.	To	this	end,	the	ECB	should	be	mandated	to	keep	the	interest
rates	low	and	to	buy	up	government	bonds	without	restriction,	if	interest	rates	rise	to	unsustainable	levels.	In	a
sense,	it	would	formally	allow	the	ECB	to	do	what	it	has	been	doing	anyway,	without	the	need	for	legal
acrobatics	to	please	the	Germans	and/or	to	get	around	the	restrictions	of	a	dysfunctional	institutional	setup.
Next,	states	should	be	allowed	to	invest	in	health	care,	research,	education,	infrastructure,	social	security	etc.
as	long	as	their	inflation	rates	are	below	or	at	target.	This	means	that	deficit	rules	have	to	be	modified	to
prevent	austerity	measures	after	the	crisis,	which	would	only	lead	to	the	next	harmful	recession	in	Europe	with
all	the	political	consequences	laid	out	before.
As	this	argument	shows,	these	measures	do	not	rest	on	either	solidarity	or	transfers.	What	is	urgently	needed
instead	is	a	certain	dose	of	pragmatism.	The	finance	ministries	of	northern	states	must	give	up	their	(untenable)
dogma	and	start	working	towards	the	long-term	survival,	viability,	and	sustainability	of	the	EMU	beyond	Covid-19.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
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Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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